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The (ab)use of import duty waivers in Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An increasingly popular but disturbing method of misappropriating 
government revenue in Nigeria is the practice of granting all manner of 
indiscriminate waivers of tariffs and duties on imported commodities under the 
directive of the Presidency. This paper critiques the law, use and abuse of duty 
waivers in Nigeria. It argues that although the President, on the advice of the 
Tariff Council, has powers to grant waivers, such powers are neither supposed 
to be granted indiscriminately nor in secret. The granting of indiscriminate 
waivers to individual operators in an industry rather than to the entire industry 
distorts national economic and industrial development which is normally the 
very essence of granting such waivers. The paper also raises questions about 
the implications of the granting of indiscriminate duty waivers by the 
Presidency for fiscal relationships in a federal state. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
An increasingly popular but disturbing method of misappropriating government revenue 
in Nigeria is the practice of granting all manner of indiscriminate waivers of tariffs and 
duties on imported commodities under the directive of the Presidency.1 This type of 
“hidden expenditures”2 began to gain notoriety under the civilian administration of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007). It has for instance been asserted that in “the 
run-up to the 2007 elections, verifiable reports by the House of Representatives 
Committee on Customs and Excise indicate that Nigeria lost over N380 billion in 
import duties which were waived by the Federal Government to its crony importers.”3 It 
                                                 
1 See Vanguard, ‘Import Duty: Retreiving Waivers from Wasteful Hands, (February 22, 2012) 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/import-duty-retrieving-waivers-from-wasteful-hands/> (December 
9, 2012).  See also Vanguard, ‘Tambuwal to FG: Stop Arbitrary Tax Waivers’, (September 27, 2011), 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/tambuwal-to-fg-stop-arbitrary-tax-waivers/> (December 10, 2012).   
2 See Uwazi at Twaweza, ‘Tanzania’s tax exemptions’ (2010), Policy brief TZ.12/2010E 
  http://twaweza.org/uploads/files/Tax%20Exemptions.PDF> (January 28, 2013) 
 
3 See Punch, ‘The Abuse of Import Duty Waivers’, (December 12, 2011), 
<http://odili.net/news/source/2011/dec/12/803.html> (December 9, 2012)  
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has further been suggested that, at least in part, such “abuse of fiscal resources by the 
Federal Government has been used for the purpose of financing elections.” The usual 
mechanism for operationalising this is to grant “favours to the ruling party and 
candidate financiers (godfathers) who in turn donate generously to party and candidate 
expenditure.”4 This is simply an extension of the corrupt practices in Nigeria which has 
been facilitated by the country’s oil rents.5 As has rightly been noted, “oil and 
corruption go together” in the country.6 Not surprisingly, the abuse of custom duty 
waivers has persisted despite the fact that the Obasanjo administration and all 
subsequent governments have publicly announced the stoppage of the granting of such 
indiscriminate waivers. The Government of Umaru Yar’Adua, which succeeded 
Olusegun Obasanjo, for instance, immediately moved to check this problem. In 
September 2007, Yar’Adua’s Finance Minister, Shamsuddeen Usman inaugurated a 
panel headed by Senator Udoma Udo Udoma to review import duty waivers and tax 
exemptions granted by the administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo. 
During this inauguration, Shamsuddeen Usman made it explicit that the practice of 
granting duty waivers and tax exemptions had been suspended.7 At the time, this policy 
was generally acclaimed by most economic observers including the World Bank.8 
Although this panel was given 8 weeks to submit its report, no such report has been 
published by the Federal Government till date. This might be explained by the fact that 
the suspension of duty waivers did not last because, as would be seen later, the 
Yar’Adua Government soon went ahead to extend some of the waivers granted by the 
Obasanjo regime. President Jonathan, who took over the reigns of power after the 
                                                 
4 Ibid.   
 
5 See S O Osoba, ‘Corruption in Nigeria: historical perspectives’, Review of African Political Economy 23 
(1996), pp. 371-386, and Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, ‘Does mother nature corrupt? Natural 
resource, corruption and economic growth’, IMF Working Paper Number 99/ 85  
 
6  Quoted in Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, ‘Rents, competition and corruption’, The American 
Economic Review 89 (1999), p. 982. 
 
7 Tax Justice Africa, ‘Nigeria: Yar’Adua Suspends Waivers Tax Exemptions’, (August 24, 2007), 
<http://taxjusticeafrica.blogspot.com/2007/08/nigeria-yaradua-suspends-waivers-tax.html> (December 9, 
2012). 
 
8  See NICON Investment Digest, ‘Yar’Adua receives a nod from the World Bank’, September 10, 2007), 
2007, 
<http://www.niconinsurance.com.ng/PagesG/NICON%20INVESTMENT%20DIGEST%20ISSUE%209.
pdf> (December 10, 2012).  
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demise of President YarAdua in 2009, also continued this illegal practice According to 
Mr. Garuba Makarfi, the Deputy Comptroller- General of Customs (Human Resources), 
in 2011 alone, the Federal Government lost N37.2bn to import duty waivers granted 
importers of raw materials alone. This was equivalent to 7 percent of the total Customs 
collection for the year.9  
 
Arguably because of the widespread public outcry against such brazen abuses of the 
Nigerian fiscal laws, the current Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister for the 
Economy, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala announced on September 22, 2011 that the President 
has lost his right to grant such waivers and that all “those who usually go to see the 
President at night will no longer be allowed to do so. If they have any proposal, it must 
be presented to the Economic Team”.10 
 
The essence of this paper is to critique the law, use and abuse of duty waivers in 
Nigeria. This paper argues that although the President, on the advice of the Tariff 
Council, has powers to grant waivers, such powers are neither supposed to be granted 
indiscriminately nor in secret. The granting of indiscriminate waivers to individual 
operators in an industry rather than to the entire industry distorts national economic and 
industrial development which is normally the very essence of granting such waivers. 
Furthermore, the granting of waivers before or without causing such to be publicly 
disclosed through publication in a Government Gazette is illegal. At the very least, 
public disclosure can serve as a check against fiscal recklessness. Finally the paper 
raises questions about the implications of the granting of indiscriminate duty waivers by 
the Presidency for fiscal relationships in a federal state. In order to achieve its objective, 
the paper is divided into four parts. Part One explores the evolution of fiscal 
relationships, the general principles behind the practice of duty waivers and the laws 
that regulate such practices in Nigeria. Part Two critiques the practice of duty waivers in 
                                                 
9 Punch, ‘FG lost N37.2bn to import waivers in 2011 – Customs’ (February 3, 2012),  
http://www.punchng.com/business/business-economy/fg-lost-n37-2bn-to-import-waivers-in-2011-
customs/> ( December 8, 2012)  
 
10 Vanguard, ‘Banks to be fully capitalized by September End- CBN’, (September 23, 2011) 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/09/banks-to-be-fully-capitalised-by-sept-end-cbn/ (December 10, 
2012).  
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Nigeria under the Obasanjo Administration while Part Three explores such practices 
under the subsequent administration of Shehu Yar’Adua and the current administration 
of President Goodluck Jonathan. Finally, Part Four concludes the paper. 
 
 
The principles of customs duty waivers in Nigeria 
 
The charging and waiving of customs duty is an integral part of the tax system in any 
country which governments routinely use in the attempt to influence economic and 
industrial development with the aim of furthering its national objectives.11 In several 
developing counties, for instance, governments provide tax incentives, which include 
duty waivers, to encourage capital formation in selected industries.12 In order to help 
achieve the above objective, such incentives must meet the characteristics of a good tax 
system which include fairness, transparency and even handed application.13 
 
Investors for instance, will naturally have more confidence in tax incentive systems that 
have the above characteristics than in systems where there is little or no transparency 
                                                 
11 Amaresh Bagch, ‘Efficacy of Tax Incentives: 'Tax Expenditure Analysis' and Its Relevance for India’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 9, 24 (1974), p. 951. See also Richard Bilsborrow and Richard Porter, 
‘The Effects of Tax Exemption on Investment by Industrial Firms in Colombia,’ Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, Bd. 108 (1972), pp. 396-426, p. 396; Quan Li, ‘Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to 
Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis,’ The Journal of Politics 68 1 (2006), p. 62; Pawan 
Sikka, ‘Financing the development and commercialization of indigenous technology in India,’ Current 
Science 73 (5) (1997), p. 406; Stephen Clark, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical 
Evidence on Effects and Alternative Policy Options, Canadian Tax Journal 48 (2000), pp.1140; United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment: A Global 
Survey, ASIT Advisory Studies No. 16 (2000), p. 11; Milan Sedmihradsky and Stanislav Klazar (2002), 
‘Tax competition for FDI in Central European Countries’ Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research Munich (Germany) Working Paper No. 647 (1), p. 1; William Ingram and Scott 
Pearson ‘The Impact of Investment Concessions on the Profitability of Selected Firms in Ghana’, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 29 (1981), p. 831. 
 
12 Robin Boadway, Frank Flatters and Jean-François Wen ‘Are Tax Incentives Biased against Small 
Firms in Thailand?’, The Journal of Developing Areas 31 1 (1996), p. 75. See also Jack M. Mintz, 
‘Corporate Tax Holidays and Investment’, The World Bank Economic Review, 4 1 (1990), pp. 81-102, p. 
81. 
 
13 Duanjie Chen, ‘Reforming the taxation incentive program in Jordan: Analysis and Recommendations’, 
University of Toronto International Tax Program Paper Number 0412 (2004), p.5. See also European 
Commission- Directorate General, Taxation and Customs Union (2004), Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base Working Group General Tax Principles, Working Document for Meeting to be held 
on Tuesday, 32 November in Brussels (p. 5).  
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and no guarantee of even handedness in the award and adjudication of tax incentives.14 
This is because policy inconsistencies distort markets.15 Efficient tax systems therefore 
determine rules upfront and ensure uniform application of tax incentives aimed at aiding 
specified sectors of the economy. This explains why the usual legal mechanism for 
establishing tax incentives like waivers is through legislation and public 
pronouncements. In Nigeria, for instance, two main laws govern the charging and 
waiving of customs duty on imported products. These are the Customs and Excise 
Management Act Number 5 of 1958 (CAP 84 of 1990) and the Customs, Excise Tariff 
etc Consolidation Act Number 4 of 1995. The Customs and Excise Management Act of 
1958, for instance, charges the Customs, Immigration and Prisons Services Board with 
the responsibility of controlling and managing the administration of the customs and 
excise laws and collecting the revenues from customs and excise duties and accounting 
for such revenues.16 The law further enshrines the concept of fairness by removing 
subjectivity and arbitrariness in the administration of customs and excise duty. In this 
direction, the supervising ministry of the above Board is specifically prevented from 
giving the Board “any direction, order or instruction in respect of any particular person 
which would have the effect of requiring the Board to increase or decrease any 
assessment of duty made or to be made or any relief given or to be given or to defer the 
collection of any duty or judgment debt due”.17  
 
The second Act that governs the charging and waiving of customs duty in Nigeria is the 
Customs, Excise Tariff etc Consolidation Act Number 4 of 1995. Schedule 1 of the said 
Act lists the duties chargeable on all imported goods while Schedule 2 lists the goods 
exempted from customs duty in Nigeria. Changes to the above listings are done through 
amendments to the act or through the yearly appropriations act. With respect to the later, 
                                                 
14 See Robert Rolfe, David Ricks, Martha Pointer, Mark McCarthy, ‘Determinants of FDI Incentive 
Preferences of MNEs’, Journal of International Business Studies 24 (2)  (1993), pp. 335-355 and  Quan 
Li, ‘Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis’, 
The Journal of Politics 68, (2006), pp. 62-74 
 
15 Anthony Mwanaumo, T.S Jayne, Ballard Zulu, Julius Shawa, Green Mbozi, Steven Haggblade and 
Misheck Nyembe, Zambia’s 2005 Maize Import and Marketing Experiences: Lessons and Implications 
(2005), <http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/zambia/PS11.pdf> (December 12, 2012).  
 
16 Section 3.  
 
17 Section 5. 
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it is for instance legitimate for the government to specify in its yearly budgets, which 
usually metamorphose into appropriations acts, amendments to the customs duty 
schedules with the main objective of promoting the development and growth of 
specified industries. With respect to the former, Government also has powers to 
regularly amend both the schedules relating to goods that have their duties waived and 
those that are charged import duties. Given the economic consequences of granting and 
waiving import duties for various economic actors, it is not surprising that the process 
of granting waivers naturally come under immense pressure and lobby from economic 
and political operators. Although it is difficult to rule out the possibility that such 
waiver awards system can be abused, the fact remains that public disclosure of the 
outcome can act as a check against indiscriminate award of duty waivers to individuals 
or companies rather than industries.18 Admittedly, even when Nigeria observed the 
above transparent system, at least in some aspects of the award of duty waivers, abuses 
were still recorded. These especially related to cases where duty waivers were exploited 
by recipients and extended to other uses. In his 1990 budget breakdown speech, for 
instance, the then Minister of Budget and Planning, Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji asserted 
thus:  
 
Government has observed with concern that the exemption from import duty 
provided under Schedule II of the Customs and Excise Decree No. 1 of 1988 
has been subjected to abuse by some importers. Government has accordingly 
decided to remove the following items from the Schedule of exemption from 
import duty: (i) Technical Assistance Importation, (ii) Importation by 
Voluntary and Religious Organizations, (iii) Food stuffs ordinarily consumed 
by Africans and produced in a territory adjoining to Nigeria, (iv) Drugs and 
Medications…. State Government Agencies have continued to include 
Customs Duty Exemption clauses in the contracts with private companies 
despite Government decision to the contrary since 1988. This practice has led 
to considerable loss of revenue to the Government. It has accordingly been 
decided that Government contracts shall no longer be entitled to exemption 
from import duty.19  
 
                                                 
18 The Robert Klitgaard equation states that corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minis 
accountability. Since public disclosure approximates to accountability, increased disclosure will have the 
effect of reducing the level of corruption in any society. Quoted in Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘the political 
economy of corruption’ in Kimberley Elliott (ed), Corruption and the Global Economy (Washington DC, 
Institute of International Economics, 1997), p. 38.  
 
19 See Budget Breakdown Speech by Minister of Budget and Planning, Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji, 
reproduced in Business Times, January 8, 1990, p. 14. 
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The legal basis for the granting of duty waivers in Nigeria outside the provisions of 
Schedules 1 and 2 of the Customs, Excise Tariff etc Consolidation Act Number 4 of 
1995 is enshrined in Section 11 of the said Act. This specifically states that the 
President may, on the recommendation of the Tariff Review Board, by order (a) impose, 
vary or remove any duty or levy; (b) add to or vary any of the schedules; (c) delete the 
whole or any part of any of the schedules; (d) substitute a new schedule or schedules 
thereto. In order to ensure transparency in the exercise of the above powers, section 11 
(3) go on to state thus: “An order made under sub section (1) of this section shall have 
effect from the date of its publication in a Gazette.” Based on the above, it is clear that 
under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, no official or organization has been 
granted the power to award duty waivers to businesses or individuals arbitrarily and/ or 
without making such waivers public knowledge. The above structure is particularly 
useful in an oil rent economy like Nigeria where corruption reign so as not to “create 
significant possibilities for suspicious behaviors from tax administrations and 
companies”20  
 
Aside from the promotion of industrial development, taxation could also play an 
important role by raising finance for governments.21 In Colonial Nigeria, this function 
was indeed more pronounced. In fact, the generation of revenue for funding the 
activities of the state played a central role in the amalgamation of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria in 1914. Specifically, the main reason for the 1914 amalgamation was 
to reduce the dependence of Northern Nigeria on British taxpayers by using the 
surpluses from Southern Nigeria to subsidize its administration.22 While this may have 
                                                 
20 Jacques Morisset and Neda Pirnia, ‘How tax policy and incentives affect foreign Direct Investment: A 
Review’ (2000), World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Number 2509, p.3.  
 
21 See Howell Zee, Janet Stoksky, and Eduardo Ley, Tax Incentives for Business Investments: A Primer 
for Policy Makers in Developing Countries, World Development 30 (2002), p. 1497; George E. Lent, 
‘Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing Countries, Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund 14 
(1967), p. 249 and Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Lionel Fontagné and Amina Lahrèche-Révil Tax Competition 
and Foreign Direct Investment, CEPII, Working Paper No 2003 – 17, p. 8. 
 
22 See, for instance, Report of the Commission on Revenue Allocation (Lagos, 1951, ‘Hicks–Phillipson 
Report’), p. 68; O. Osadolor, ‘The development of the federal idea and the federal framework’, in K. 
Amuwo, A. Agbaje, R. Suberu and G. Herault (eds.), Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria 
(Ibadan, 1998), p. 35; R. Nwokedi, Revenue Allocation and Resource Control in Nigerian Federation 
(Enugu, 2001), p. 20; and Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Political Bureau (Lagos, 1987), p. 
169. 
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made administrative sense, it laid the foundations of the distrust in all aspects of nation 
building in Nigeria. Central to this distrust is the revenue allocation arrangement 
between the various sections of the country.23 Under the colonial rule, such tensions did 
not become immediately apparent. All these however changed with the movement 
towards political independence. 
 
Despite the objective of the amalgamation, it was not until 1946 that the Richards 
Constitution for the first time established an all Nigeria legislative council. Although its 
role was purely advisory, it raised the contentious question of revenue sharing between 
the federal and regional governments. This led the colonial authorities to appoint Sir 
Sydney Phillipson, the then Financial Secretary of the Nigerian Colony, to investigate 
the problems of the distribution of financial and administrative powers between the 
various tiers of government.24 In his Report, Phillipson was of the opinion that the 
devolution of powers from the center to the regions was desirable. Based on the above, 
his report recommended the gradual evolution to a revenue sharing system based mainly 
on the derivation principle.25 The preference of Phillipson for the derivation principle 
was based on his belief that there was need to inculcate in each region, a sense of 
“financial responsibility” so that they will all learn to “cut their coat according to their 
cloth.”26  
 
In 1951, the country adopted the Macpherson Constitution and in 1953, the Littleton 
Constitution replaced the Macpherson Constitution culminating in the appointment of 
the Sir Louis Chick Commission of Inquiry into revenue sharing in Nigeria. The 1953 
Chick Commission Report also strongly favoured derivation as the basis for revenue 
                                                 
 
23 See, for instance, M. Hiskett, ‘Lugard and the amalgamation of Nigeria: a documentary record [book 
review]’, African Affairs, 70 (1971). 
 
24 A. Phillips (1971), Nigeria’s Federal Financial Experience, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Volume 9, Number 3, p. 393  
 
25 A. Adebayo (1993), Embattled Federalism: History of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria, 1946-1990 (New 
York, Peter Lang Publishers), p. 35.  
 
26 Quoted in C. Uche and O. Uche (2004), Oil and the Politics of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria, African 
Studies Centre, Leiden, Working Paper Number 54/2004, p. 11. 
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allocation. In summary, the Report recommended that: the federal government should 
keep 50% of the general import duty while 50% should go to the regions on derivation 
basis; the federal government should keep 50% of the import and excise duty on 
tobacco, the rest going to the regions based on derivation; 100% of the import duty on 
motor spirit should go to the regions; 100% of the mining rent and royalty should go to 
the regions, and; both levels should share the export duty on hides and skins on a 50-50 
basis.27 
 
 The above was the revenue allocation arrangement that was in place in Nigeria when 
the Colonial Government, in November 1955, set up a Committee to advise on the 
stimulation of industrial development by affording relief from import duties and 
protection to Nigerian industry. In the light of the fact that any such import duty relief 
was unlikely to uniformly impact on both the finances and development of the various 
regions, the granting of duty waivers instantly became a contentious and divisive issue 
in Nigeria. The Committee therefore took great care to reconcile the cost allocation for 
operationalising the scheme with its benefit allocation amongst the constituent 
governments of the Nigeria federation. Along these lines, the Report asserted thus: 
 
Normally relief should be afforded by the payment to the undertaking of a sum 
equivalent to the whole or the part (as the case may be) of the duties paid on 
imported materials which the Department of Customs and Excise is satisfied 
has been used in local manufacture. The recommendation will involve the 
Federal Government bearing the whole cost of providing relief even though it 
will only have retained 49½ percent of the duty paid by the industry in the first 
place…. [i]n the long run the revenue of the Federal Government will stand to 
gain directly from the development of industry through the increase in the yield 
of Company Tax. The whole of the sums collected in Company Tax are under 
the present Constitution retained by the Federal Government and it is this 
allocation of revenue (together with the fact that the Federal Government will 
have received as revenue half the sum involved) which makes it possible for 
the Federal Government to contemplate bearing unilaterally the cost of 
refunding to industry sums collected on behalf of all the Governments of the 
Federation.28    
                                                 
27 Government of Nigeria (1953), Report of Fiscal Commissioner on Financial Effects of Proposed New 
Constitutional Arrangements Revenue (Lagos, Government Printer [Chick Report]), pp. 25-7. 
 
28 Federation of Nigeria (1956), Statement of Policy Proposed by the Federal Government on the Report 
by a Committee appointed to advise on the stimulation of Industrial Development by Affording Relief 
from Import Duties and Protection to Nigerian Industry (Lagos, Federal Government Printer, pp. 3-4.  
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From the above, it is clear that a derivation based revenue allocation system provides an 
intrinsic mechanism to check abuses of the fiscal system in a federal state. This is so 
because there is an incentive for the constituent governments to ensure that all fiscal 
policies including customs duty waivers that negatively impact on their revenue must 
have at least an equivalent positive impact to the general economic wellbeing of the 
specific region. The abuse of duty waivers under such economic environment was 
therefore far fetched. The discovery of oil in Nigerian in 1956 however fundamentally 
altered the arguments with respect to revenue allocation in the country.  
 
In 1958, as a fall out of the 1957/58 Constitutional Conference, the Federal Government 
appointed Sir Jeremy Raisman and Professor Ronald Tress to review the federal fiscal 
structure. They recommended the de-emphasis on derivation as the basis for revenue 
sharing. The reason for the above was the potential impact of the newly discovered oil 
revenues on national development.29 The Raisman Report, which also introduced the 
Distributable Pools Account (DPA), therefore significantly reduced the use of derivation as 
a principle for revenue allocation in Nigeria.30 
 
The discovery of oil was no doubt the beginning of the emergence of Nigeria as a 
rentier state. Over time, the concept of derivation increasingly lost ground in the 
allocation of revenues in Nigeria. With subsequent increases in the revenues from oil 
rents, the focus of the constituent units of the Nigerian federation gradually shifted from 
revenue generation to revenue allocation. The consequence of the above is that the 
derivation basis of revenue allocation consistently depreciated reaching an all time low 
of only 2 percent in 1984 and then rising to the current rate of 13 percent in 1999.31 Not 
surprisingly, the struggle for the control of oil rents in Nigeria played an important part 
                                                 
29 Colonial Office, Nigeria (1958), Report of the Fiscal Commission (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office [Raisman Report]), p. 24. 
 
30 ‘Raisman Report’, pp. 31-2.   
 
31 Uche and Uche, ‘Oil and Politics of Revenue Allocation’, pp. 30-31. 
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in the current level of insecurity and corruption in the Nigerian State.32 The current 
arrangement gives little encouragement to states to strive to be economically productive. 
The willingness and ability of states to question the abuse of fiscal rules for personal or 
sectional interests have been greatly diminished. Although Nigeria is supposed to be a 
Federal State, this is only but in name. The resources of the country that are supposed to 
be shared among the various tiers of government are regularly abused with little 
consequence.33 Such abuse of fiscal rules for personal or sectional interest date back to 
the post Independence government of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The first Prime 
Minister of Independent Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew documented his meeting with the 
then Nigeria’s Finance Minister, Festus Okotie Eboh in January 1966 when he attended 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in Lagos thus:  
 
Raja [Foreign Minister of Singapore] and I were seated opposite a hefty 
Nigerian, Chief Festus, their finance minister. The conversation is still fresh in 
my mind. He was going to retire soon, he said. He had done enough for his 
country and now had to look after his business, a shoe factory. As finance 
minister, he had imposed a tax on imported shoes so that Nigeria could make 
shoes. Raja and I were incredulous…. I went to bed that night convinced that 
they were a different people playing to a different set of rules.34 
 
Under the Obasanjo civilian regime the granting of indiscriminate and illegal duty 
waivers simply became an additional tool for perpetrating such abuses. Aside from the 
illegality of granting such indiscriminate waivers in Nigeria, the concept also raises 
serious constitutional issues. This is especially so given the fact that Nigeria is a 
federation consisting of three tiers of Government: the Federal, the State and the Local 
Government. Section 162 of the Nigerian Constitution makes it explicit that the 
                                                 
32 See S. Khan, Nigeria: the Political Economy of Oil (Oxford, 1994), pp. 8-9. See also S. Decker, 
Corporate Legitimacy and Advertising: British Companies and the Rhetoric of Development in West 
Africa, 1950-1970, Business History Review 81 (2007), p. 76. 
 
33 Other methods of such abuses include: inflation of contracts, oil bunkering, indiscriminate award of oil 
blocs and brazen stealing through security votes. See, for instance, Obiamaka Egbo, Ifeoma Nwakoby, 
Josaphat Onwumere and Chibuike Uche, ‘Security Votes in Nigeria: Disguising Stealing from the Public 
Purse’, African Affairs 111/ 445 (2012), pp. 597-614.  
34 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 (Harper Publishers, 
2000). p. 393.  
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“Federation shall maintain a special account to be called “the Federation Account” into 
which shall be paid all revenues collected by the Government of the Federation, except 
the proceeds from the personal income tax of the personnel of the armed forces of the 
Federation, the Nigeria Police Force, the Ministry or department of government charged 
with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and the residents of the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja.” The Constitution further provides that any “amount standing to the credit of the 
Federation Account shall be distributed among the Federal and State Governments and 
the Local Government Councils in each State on such terms and in such manner as may 
be prescribed by the National Assembly.” In the context of the above therefore, it is fair 
to argue that non-statutory waivers which are executed at the whims of the Presidency 
which in some cases favour only narrow interest groups distorts the principle of equity 
in revenue allocation. Such waivers always reduce the revenue that go into the 
Federation Account and thus the share of the Federation account that go to the States 
and the Local Governments.35  
 
Another consequence of the Nigerian oil boom was that income from import duties 
remained an insignificant part of government revenue for a very long time. As would be 
seen later, it was only when economic difficulties set in that the revenue generation 
potentials of import duties came to the fore. With import duty income at insignificant 
levels, there was little incentive or need for economic and political interests to push for 
the waiver of such duties. Based on the above, it is not surprising that there is no 
evidence that the Gowon administration (1967-1975) engaged in indiscriminate granting 
of import duty waivers. General Murtala Muhammed, which replaced Gowon as Head 
of State was assassinated after only six months in office. The Nigerian economy 
however substantially weakened during the regime of Muhammed’s successor, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo. In his 1978/ 1979 budget speech for instance, Obasanjo stated that:  
 
To be able to finance our recurrent and capital commitments… it has been 
necessary to introduce and revamp a number of fiscal measures. In this 
connection, there has been a general upward revision in import and excise 
duties as a means of raising additional revenue, protecting domestic industries 
and discouraging the importation and consumption of non essential foreign 
manufactures.36   
                                                 
35 See Punch, ‘The Abuse of Import Duty Waivers’. 
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Despite the above increases, there is no evidence that the Obasanjo (military) 
administration engaged in widespread granting and abuse of indiscriminate duty 
waivers. The same can be said of the subsequent civilian government of Shehu Shagari 
and the military government of General Muhammadu Buhari.  
 
On August 1985, General Babangida came to power through a military coup. It is 
widely believed that his Government (1985-1993) ‘marked a transformation in Nigeria’s 
already notorious corruption, turning it into a generalized instrument of government.’37 
The fiscal recklessness of the government was not in doubt. An official Government 
panel headed by the Late Pius Okigbo, which was set up to investigate the activities of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria in 1994 reported that during his regime, $12.2 billion was 
diverted.38 The existence of huge excess crude oil revenue money may explain why the 
Government had no need to exploit the fraudulent enrichment potentials in manipulating 
import duty waivers. Rather, the administration made explicit its intention to resist such 
abuses. In 1990, for instance, Babangida’s Minister of Finance stated in a press 
conference on the 1991 budget that “many tariff complaints made for the particularist 
interests of the affected organizations were not entertained because of their negative 
economy wide effects”.39  
 
Although the Government later amended some of the duties based on complaints, such 
amendments were properly done through legislation and thus were publicly disclosed. 
In 1992, for instance, the Babangida Government, as a consequence of the harsh 
economic consequences of the Structural Adjustment Programme, promulgated the 
                                                                                                                                               
36 See 1978/ 79 Budget Speech by the Head of State General Olusegun Obasanjo, Reproduced in the 
Punch, April 33, 1978, p. 13.  
 
37 Stephen Ellis, ‘West Africa’s international drug trade’, African Affairs 108, 431 (2009), pp. 171–96, p. 
179. See also Antonia Oko-osi, ‘Corruption and corrupt practices: institutionalization and legitimization 
under the Babangida administration’, Malthouse Monograph on Africa Series Number 7 (2007). 
 
38 Philip Ujomu, ‘The economy, resource management and the maintenance of national security in 
Nigeria: a critique of the Shagari, Babangida and Abacha regimes’, Nigerian Journal of Economic 
History 3 (2000), pp. 84–96, p. 91. 
 
39 See Press Briefing by the Minister of Budget and Planning Dr. Chu S P Okongwu, on the 1991 Budget 
and National Rolling Plan (1991-1993) on January 2, 1991. 
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Customs, Excise Tariff etc (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree Number 13 of 1992 and   
Customs, Excise Tariff etc (Miscellaneous Provisions) (No. 2) Decree Number 25 of 
1992. These reduced import duty tariffs on several goods including CKD Components, 
spare parts for commercial vehicles, cement, among others. From the above, it is clear 
that even under Babangida, the established rule of public disclosure, through law or 
gazette, in the granting of custom duty waivers was obeyed. As already argued, this was 
no doubt a check against any indiscriminate granting of such waivers to specific 
individuals or business interests. After Babangida was forced to step aside, the short 
lived Transition Government of Ernest Shonekan also did not grant any indiscriminate 
import duty waivers. All it did was to extend the lifespan of the waivers granted by the 
Babangida Government which were aimed at ameliorating the consequences of SAP to 
the end of 1993. This was “in realization of the fact that the lead time between the time 
at which concessions were granted and the time at which the consumers began to benefit 
is fairly long.”40 There is also no evidence that the subsequent Government of General 
Sani Abacha indulged in the indiscriminate granting and abuse of import duty waivers. 
This was so despite the fact that General Abacha was generally perceived as a corrupt 
and brutal leader who had little patience for opposition.41 A landmark of the Abacha 
regime was the jailing of General Obasanjo for alleged complicity in a plot to overthrow 
the government. After the sudden death of General Abacha in 1998, his Chief of 
Defence Staff, General Abubakar was sworn in as Head of State. He immediately 
announced a short transition to civil rule and released several political prisoners 
including General Obasanjo. During his short reign, there is also no evidence that his 
administration engaged in indiscriminate granting of customs duty waivers. It was not 
until the civilian administration of Olusegun Obasanjo that widespread abuse in the 
granting of import duty waivers without following due process became public 
knowledge.  
 
 
                                                 
 
40 1993 Budget of Transition by Chief E A O Shonekan, CBE Head of Government and Chairman of 
Transitional Council to the Joint Session of the National Assembly (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
Undated) pp. 24-25.  
 
41 See Hoda Soliman, ‘Nigeria’s transition program: the endless course to civilian government and 
democracy’, New England International and Comparative Law Annual 4 (1998), pp. 253–62. 
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Obasanjo and the abuse of duty waivers in Nigeria 
 
On May 29 1999, General Obasanjo, after winning the 1999 presidential elections, was 
sworn in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Initially, the Obasanjo 
government respected the laws guiding the administration of customs duty and its 
waivers in the country. In its 2000 budget speech to the National Assembly, for 
instance, President Obasanjo made explicit the intention of his administration to adhere 
to the laed down process of granting import duty waivers through statutes:  
Since the inception of this administration, approvals for import duty waivers 
have been strictly based on existing statutes. There is, however, the need to 
review some statutes that have given too many incentives to certain sectors 
thereby bringing such incentives in line with the economic realities of the 
country. Towards this end, it is intended that in the year 2000, an Inter-
Ministerial Committee will be set up to review and make recommendations to 
government which will be submitted as a bill to the National Assembly.42  
Shortly after this speech, the administration changed its mind. Although it is unclear 
when this began, what is obvious is that indiscriminate approvals of such duty waivers 
by various government functionaries culminated in a directive from the Department of 
Customs and Excise to try and curb such abuses. This was done through a directive 
issued in Circular No.12 of 2000 dated October 5, 2000, reference number 
NCS/DCG/CUS/018/S.4/vol.8 and sent to all zonal coordinators and customs area 
controllers, customs officers. Specifically, the above officers were directed to ignore 
requests and grants for import duty waivers unless approved personally by the 
President. Rather than follow the legal process for granting such waivers, the Obasanjo 
administration decided to illegally appropriate such powers to the President. It was 
under the cover of the above illegal directive that former President Obansanjo 
personally granted “all sorts of frivolous waivers”43 Given the secret nature of such 
waivers especially as the legal and proper mechanism of making such waivers public 
had been sabotaged, information on such waivers granted is difficult to come by. Such 
information only become publicly available mainly through press reports when there is 
                                                 
 
42 See Full text of President Olusegun Obasanjo Speech on Presenting Budget 2000 to the joint Session of 
the National Assembly Abuja November 24, 1999. Downloaded on November 2, 2012 from 
http://www.nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/budget2000.html  
 
43 Punch, ‘Abuse of Import Duty Waivers.’  
 18 
a change of government or when there are disputes among the ruling class. The fact that 
such information is rarely denied and the calibre of officials that sometimes provide 
such information give credence to the said press reports. 
 
A major beneficiary of the Obasanjo tax and duty waiver illegalities is the billionaire 
businessman, Aliko Dangote and his Dangote Group of Companies. A Dangote 
company report published in 2006 showed that at that time, the company controlled 81 
percent of the Nigerian sugar market, 40 percent of the cement market, 33 percent of the 
flour market, 54 percent of the pasta market and 72 percent of the salt market. “The 
latest figure indicates that the Dangote Group still maintains the first position in each of 
these commodities; now controlling about 93 per cent of the sugar market, 86 per cent 
of cement, 73 per cent of flour, 74 per cent of pasta and 89 per cent of salt.”44 It was 
therefore not surprising that in 2011, Dangote was listed as the richest man in Africa by 
Forbes magazine. 45 The entwinement of political patronage and import duty waivers in 
Nigeria is perhaps best brought out by this case. During the two presidential elections 
that Obasanjo contested (1999 and 2003), Dangote donated N100 million and N250 
million respectively to his campaign. Aside from the above, he also donated N211.6 
million towards the construction of Obasanjo’s Presidential Library and cement worth 
N3 billion towards the construction of the head office of the Obasanjo’s ruling Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) all during Obasanjo’s tenure as President.46 Based on the 
above, it was therefore not surprising that some of the companies in the Dangote Group 
                                                 
 
44 Quoted in The Nation, ‘Ibeto Cement Imports Just 1.5 Million Metric Tonnes Annually’ (December 28, 
2012) < http://thenationonlineng.net/new/news/ibeto-cement-imports-just-1-5m-metric-tonnes-annually/> 
(January 6, 2013). 
 
45  See Forbes, ‘Aliko Dangote: Net Worth $12 b as at November 2012’, (undated) 
http://www.forbes.com/profile/aliko-dangote/> (January 11, 2013).  
  
46 See Sulaiman Kura, ‘Political parties and democracy in Nigeria: candidate selection, campaign and part 
financing in People’s Democratic Party’, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 13 (2011), 
pp.268-298; Frank Kintum,, ‘The Man Aliko Dangote’, (undated) <http://lakedistrict-
investment.com/downloads/TheManAlikoDangote.pdf>  (January 7, 2013); The Money File ‘the Story of 
Dangote’s Wealth’ (undated) <http://themoneyfile.com/the-story-of-dangotes-wealth/> (January 7, 2013);  
Guardian, ‘Obasanjo’s library nets N4 bn’ (undated). 
<http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/697.html> (January 7, 2013); Nairaland, ‘Otedola 
Donates 1 Billion Naira To Pdp , Dangote 3biliion. May God Help The Poor’ (November 19, 2008), 
<http://www.nairaland.com/197548/otedola-donates-1-billion-naira> (January 6, 2013); and Newswatch, 
‘Donations of Controversy’, (May 23, 2005), 
http://www.newswatchngr.com/editorial/allaccess/nigeria/10523131440.htm> (December 11, 2012) 
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were beneficiaries of the indiscriminate custom duty waivers awarded by the Obasanjo 
administration.  
 
One such company was Dan Salt. Obasanjo gave “illegal generous concessions,” to Dan 
Salt which included tax, tariff and duty waivers and permission to operate a factory 
inside Apapa port. The result was that Dan Salt enjoyed “in-equitable” advantage over 
its competitors. It operated with huge profits while other companies like its older 
competitor, Union Dicon Salt Company recorded persistent losses and eventually failed. 
It is such duty waiver frauds that made Obasanjo’s erstwhile Defence Minister, General 
Theophelus Danjuma, who was incidentally a major shareholder in Union Dicon 
Company to describe him as “the most toxic leader that Nigeria has produced so far” 
who “abused Nigeria, deceived Nigeria and deserves a second term in prison.”47 
Dangote Cement was also another major beneficiary of the Obasanjo administration. It 
has, for instance, been alleged that the administration helped Dangote Cement to acquire 
majority shares in Benue Cement Company.48 It has also been suggested that during the 
period, Dangote manipulated “his unfettered access to those in the seat of political 
power in Nigeria… [and] seized virtually full possession of the cement market and 
swept up some of the highest import quotas of all local companies.”49 A leaked US 
Embassy cable on Dangote dated March 7, 2007 reported that “Dangote is counted 
among President Obasanjo’s inner circle of business advisers” and that it “is no 
coincidence that many products on Nigeria’s import ban list are items in which Dangote 
has major interests.” The cable further stated that Dangote “has had success blocking 
trade and investment that might compete with his enterprises.”50 As would be seen in 
                                                 
47 See Nigerian Voice, ‘Revealed: How Dangote tore Danjuma and Obasanjo Apart,’ (June 27, 2009) 
<http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvprint/525/6/revealed-how-dangote-tore-danjuma-and-obasanjo-
apa.html> (December 11, 2012).  
 
48 Frank Kintum, ‘The Man Aliko Dangote.’ 
 
49 Sahara Reporters, ‘Cement King: How Aliko Dangote Wangled his Way to Billionaires List,‘ (March 
10, 2011), http://saharareporters.com/news-page/cement-king-how-aliko-dangote-wangled-his-way-
billionaires-list> (December 11, 2012).  
50 The Street Journal, ‘Wikileaks Cable: Obasanjo’s Unfair Advantage To Dangote Harmed Nigerian & 
American Markets’ (September 5, 2011), http://thestreetjournal.org/2011/09/wikileaks-cable-
obasanjo%E2%80%99s-unfair-advantage-to-dangote-harmed-nigerian-american-markets/> (December 
11, 2012).   
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the next section, Obasanjo also aided the Dangote Group by closing down the cement 
factory of one of his competitors: Ibeto Cement.  
Another controversial waiver granted by the Obasanjo administration was the $3 billion 
import duty waiver to Western Metal Products Company Limited (WEMPCO) Nigeria 
Limited, a Chinese company for the establishment of a $250 million cold rolled steel 
plant in the country. The Federal Ministry of Finance have tried to address part of the 
outrage that this transaction caused by clarifying that “the duty concessions and 
incentives should comprise five percent duty rate across the board on all raw materials 
for two years, zero percent duty rate and VAT exemptions on all plants and machinery.” 
Despite this, it remains unclear where the $3 billion dollars came from. This raises 
questions about possible abuse of such a waiver through the importation of unrelated 
items under the cover of such waivers.51 It is important to note that this waiver, which 
has been described as a “non transparent business transaction”, was granted in an 
industry where Nigerian enterprises are active.52 
Sometimes the illegal waivers granted mainly as political patronage of personal favours 
have been switched and used for other items not intended in the waiver. One such case 
came to light recently when a close associate of former President Obasanjo was arrested 
for doing just that. According to a news report on the subject matter:   
In one celebrated case, officials of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) arrested a businessman connected with former President Obasanjo's elaborate 
import duty waiver scam. Sam Iwuajoku, owner of Unigate Investments and co-owner 
                                                 
51 Such waivers are also sometimes sold to other parties. It has, for instance been reported that the current 
Minister of Aviation in Nigeria, Mrs Stella Odua-Ogiemwonyin, “a widely acknowledged friend of the 
President [once] used her influence to secure a waiver of duty for importation of rice valued at N13.5b 
last year” under the name of Network Supplies Limited. The “enterprise was set up just to secure that 
particular government concession and nothing more.” The paper was then sold to the controversial 
Stallion Group owned by the Vaswani Brothers. See Society Now, ‘SPG Oil Boss, Stella Odua sells 13.5b 
Waiver to Vaswani Brothers!’ (undated), < http://societynowng.com/SPG-Oil-Boss-Stella-Odua-Sells-
N13-5b-Waiver-To-Vaswani-Brothers> (January 7, 2013).  
 
52  BusinessDay, ‘Duty Waiver to Chinese Firm Granted by Obasanjo,’ (October 18, 2008), 
http://www.businessdayonline.com/ARCHIVE/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=686:du
ty-waiver-to-chinese-firm-granted-by-obasanjo&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=18 (December 11, 2012). 
See also Businessday, ‘FG Grants $3bn Import Waiver to Chinese Firm’, (October 12, 2008) 
<http://www.businessdayonline.com/ARCHIVE/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=568:f
g-grants-3bn-import-waiver-to-chinese-firm&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=18> (December 9, 2012) and 
BusinessDay, ‘Fresh Protest Over FG’s Reviewed Waiver to WEMPCO’ (June 14, 2009), 
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3187:fresh-
protest-over-fgs-reviewed-waiver-to-wempco&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50> (December 11, 2012). 
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of Gibraltar-based Seaside View Management Limited. The shadowy Iwuajuoku, who 
has little or no public profile, is a known associate of Senator Emmanuel Andy Uba, 
Obasanjo's former senior assistant for domestic affairs. Investigations revealed that 
Mr. Sam Iwuajoku received an import waiver from Obasanjo in 2003 under the 
pretext of engaging in construction work in the Niger Delta. Instead, Iwuajoku used 
the waiver to import iron rods and rice, raking in more than 100 billion naira in 
personal gains. In one instance, according to our source, he imported three shipments 
of rice and paid nothing in duties to the Federal Government.53 
Like most fraud investigations in Nigeria, nothing has been heard of this case and 
investigations ever since.  
Another notable beneficiary of the Obasanjo duty waiver bonanza was the 
Redeemed Christian Church of God. It has been alleged that the General Overseer 
of the Church, Pastor Enoch Adejare Adeboye, exploited his close links with 
Obasanjo to get indiscriminate import duty waivers that “cost Nigeria a whooping 
N20 Billion in revenue loss between 2006 and 2007”. In the year 2006 for instance, 
“RCCG got an import waiver of N9,831,109,309.00 through certificate no. 
BO/REV/12235/S.2/T.133 to import construction materials; generators and 
vehicles. The value of the imports was N49,155,546,846.00.”54 Although the 
Government, arguably because of pressure from several quarters announced the 
stoppage of the granting of indiscriminate duty waivers in 2006, it failed to keep to 
its word.55 In 2007, the same RCCG through certificate number 
BO/R10260/V111/161, “was granted rights to import building/construction 
materials….[valued] at N48,988,454,876.00 with a total waiver of 
N9,757,690.975.20. The two waivers total N19,588,800,284,20.” Like in the case 
of Sam Iwuajoku, some of the illegal waivers were also exploited for economic 
gain. It was for instance alleged that many of the “luxury cars that were said to have 
been imported through the deal were not meant for private use. They were said to 
                                                 
 
53 Nigeria Politico, ‘Import Waivers: How the Presidency, Politicians, the business elite and foreigners rip 
Nigeria of Billions’ (Undated), <http://nigeriapolitico.com/importwaivers.html> (December 9, 2012). 
 
54  Nairaland, ‘Adeboye, Redeem Church Leader In N20 Billion Import Waiver Scandal - Politics – 
Nairaland’ (November 5, 2007), http://www.nairaland.com/91292/adeboye-redeem-church-leader-n20> 
(December 9, 2012). See also Pointblanknews, ‘Adeboye, Redeem Church Leader in N20 Billion Import 
Waiver Scandal’, (Undated)  http://www.pointblanknews.com/os635.html> (December 8, 2012). 
 
55 See Daily Trust, ‘Obasanjo Stops Import Duty Waivers, Duty Exemptions’ (August 23, 2008) < 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200508240036.html>, (January 7, 2013).  
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have been sold at several car dealerships across the country.”56 As would be seen in 
the next section, even after Obasanjo completed his tenure, as President, this 
practice of granting illegal indiscriminate waivers have been continued by his 
successors.  
 
The abuse of duty waivers in Nigeria after Obasanjo 
In May 2007, President Obasanjo handed over power to President Shehu Musa 
Yar’Adua. On August 23, 2007, President Yar’Adua directed that the issuance of 
waivers, exemptions from taxes, duties and tariffs to individuals, companies or 
organizations, be suspended with immediate effect. According to the then Finance 
Minister, Samsudeen Usman,  Speaking at a Ministerial Press Briefing tagged “The 
New Road Map to Economic Reforms”, Shamsudeen Usman, the then Finance 
Minister, asserted that “the suspension became necessary to plug a number of 
revenue leakages through which corruption was perpetrated in the last three years.” 
He further stated that “the amount of waivers given so far was alarming” and 
pointed out that “the Comptroller-General of Customs told us that one particular 
waiver was granted ten times over.” Furthermore, “a lot of state governments, 
private sector operators and churches were being granted [waivers] 
indiscriminately. Somebody was organizing a game and was asking for waivers to 
import 600 cars.”57 
President Yar’Adua later reinforced this position when fielding questions from about 
300 members of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). 
Yar’Adua specifically made it clear that no investor in Nigeria, whether foreign or local, 
would be given preferential treatment over another. In response to a question, the 
President Yar’Adua stated that asserted thus the “concessions we give are on [a] 
                                                 
 
56 Pointblanknews, ‘Adeboye, Redeem Church Leader in N20 Billion Import Waiver Scandal.’  
 
57 Thisday, ‘Nigeria: Yar’Adua Suspends Waivers, Tax Exemptions’, (August 24, 2007). 
http://taxjusticeafrica.blogspot.com/2007/08/nigeria-yaradua-suspends-waivers-tax.html> (December 11, 
2012) 
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sectoral basis, especially for pioneer businesses. But we will not grant waivers or 
concessions to any investor on [a] preferential basis.”58  
 
The abuse of fiscal rules by the Obasanjo administration was however extended to other 
spheres of business regulation in the country. This ensured that once President 
Yar’Adua was inaugurated, he was inundated with petitions from businesses protesting 
about their unfair treatment under the Obasanjo administration. One such company was 
the Ibeto Cement Company which was granted investment incentives by the Obasanjo 
administration and later shut down by the same administration. It is widely believed that 
the closure of the said Ibeto Company during the Obasanjo administration was 
instigated by his competitor Dangote Cement. The story of these bizarre developments 
in Ibeto Cement has been told by the Executive Director Strategy and Public Affairs of 
Ibeto Cement, Ben Aghazu thus:  
 
the federal government had issued a guarantee to Ibeto Cement Company 
Limited that the company’s proposed cement bagging plant in Bundu Ama, 
near Port Harcourt, shall operate for a minimum period of 10 years from 
commissioning so as to meet the strict funding requirements of the lending 
institutions. The federal government had also encouraged the company with 
appropriate incentives such as reduced duty on imported equipment and waiver 
of Value Added Tax (VAT)… However, in September 2005, a mere three 
months after our gleaming new plant began operation, the cement cartel, led by 
Dangote Cement, used its reach in the federal government, to unjustifiably and 
unexplainably close down the operation of the Ibeto bagging plant... after 
various efforts of appeal to the federal government failed, the company went to 
court in 2006 to seek justice.59 
 
Although Ibeto went to court to seek redress during the Obasanjo administration, it was 
not until 2007, after Yar’Adua came to power that the matter was resolved out of Court 
with the cooperation of the Yar’Adua administration.60 This was through a consent 
judgment entered by the Federal High Court in Suits Number FHC/ABJ/CS/400/2006 
                                                 
58 See Olusegun Adeniyi (2012), Power, Politics and Death (Lagos, Prestige/ Kachifo Limited). 
 
59 Leadership, ‘Cement Glut: Ibeto debunks Dangote’s Claim on Imports’ (January 2, 2013) 
<http://www.leadership.ng/nga/articles/43946/2013/01/02/cement_glut_ibeto_debunks_dangotes_claim_i
mports.html> (January 9, 2013)  
 
60 See Adeniyi, ‘Power, Politics and Death’,  
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and FHC/ABJ/CS/496/2010. In the judgment order, the federal government 
acknowledged that the Ibeto Cement Company Bagging Plant was “unjustifiably closed 
down”. The government also acknowledged “the enormous losses suffered by Ibeto 
Cement Company from the unjustified closure from 2005 to October 2007,” It was in 
line with the above that part of the judgment ordered the Federal Government to pay 
Ibeto Cement N7.8 billion for the unjustified closure of its plant between 2005 and 
2007.61 The judgment further stipulated that Ibeto Cement should be allowed to import 
1.5 million tonnes of bulk cement per annum for the period from October 1, 2007 - 
September 30, 2017 in line with the federal government guarantee conveyed in the 
ministry of Industry letters, reference HMSI/EXT/CORR/VOL.X/350 of June 5, 2002 
and HMSI/EXT.CORR/VOL.XII/127 of November 29, 2002. The consequence of this 
judgment is that Ibeto Cement is now the only authorized importer of bulk cement in the 
country. Interestingly, Dangote Cement has now taken the Federal Government to Court 
alleging discrimination in the granting of license to Ibeto Cement for the importation of 
bulk cement.62   
 
Another company that also petitioned President Yar Adua alleging unjust treatment 
under President Obasanjo was the Stallion Group. Specifically, Obasanjo deported the 
three Indian brothers who own the group: Sunil, Haresh and Mahesh Vaswani in 2006 
over alleged tax evasion. Yar’Adua again consented to the Court judgment that 
facilitated their return to Nigeria. The reason for this has been explained thus:  
 
Yar’Adua… forwarded [the petition of the Vaswani Brothers] to the AGF 
[Auditor General of the Federation], the Ministry of Interior, EFCC and 
Customs for their comments. While the Ministry of Interior insisted that since 
the deportation was done on the orders of his predecessor it should not be 
reviewed, EFCC said their investigations against the Vaswanis had not been 
completed before their deportation was effected. The decision of the federal 
                                                 
61 Nation, ‘Dangote Loses Bid for Speedy Hearing on Suit Against Competitor, July 10, 2012), 
http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/53326-dangote-loses-bid-for-speedy-hearing-of-
suit-against-competitor.html> (December 8, 2012).   
 
62 See Daily Times, ‘Dangote Vs. Ibeto: Judge Wants Single Hearing’, (July 4, 2012),   
http://dailytimes.com.ng/article/dangote-vs-ibeto-judge-wants-single-hearing> (December 8, 2012) and 
Nation, ‘Federal Government, Dangote in Legal Battle over Cement Import Waiver’, (June 5, 2012)  
<http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/law/49039-fed-govt-dangote-in-legal-battle-over-
cement-import-waiver.html> (December 8, 2012).  
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government to deport them as at the time it did was therefore considered hasty, 
a position that had been canvassed by Prince Bola Ajibola, former attorney 
general of the federation and retired judge at the International Criminal Court 
in Hague. Ajibola had written the president a letter on the issue. In the end, the 
president kept faith with the rule of law by directing that the deportation be 
rescinded.63 
 
As stated above, this is the same group that was alleged to have bought duty waiver 
papers from Network Supplies Limited. More recently, former President Obasanjo has 
alleged that the Stallion Group as at September 2011 “have enjoyed over N50 billion 
($316m) in waivers and things they have brought in corruptly.”64 This allegation was 
also repeated in the Federal House of Representatives culminating in an investigation by 
the House.65 On their part, the Vaswani Brothers have strenuously denied this 
allegation.66 The result of this investigation is still pending.   
 
The promise of the Yar’Adua administration not to grant duty waivers in order to create 
a level playing field for industries in the country however did not last. Shortly after 
suspending the duty waiver malpractice, his administration went ahead to revalidate 
some of the waivers that were granted by the Obasanjo administration. One such waiver 
was that given to an Indian firm: African Steel Mills Nigeria Limited. The company was 
said to have “made a case for revalidation of the waiver, citing a factory expansion 
project.” African Steel Mills (Nigeria) Limited subsequently, at different times, 
imported several ship loads of steel without paying the required import duties. 
Unfortunately, the materials are not all used for the purpose approved. “When they 
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66 See Guardian, ‘Vaswani’s hail Reps Probe on 50Bn Waivers’ (November 21, 2011) 
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import these materials, they divert a chunk to a sister company…. From there, they sell 
in the open market.” In one transaction in 2008, the company “imported 4,000 metric 
tons without paying a kobo as import duty to the government”. Without the waiver, the 
company would have paid “20 per cent duty (N80million); seven per cent surcharge on 
duty (N5.6million) and five per cent VAT (N24.56million) amounting to 
N110.6million”. With its waiver, however, “the company paid a paltry N5.6million, 
scheming off about N104.56million, in a transaction that reeks of scam.”67 
 
President Yar’Adua’s administration was however short-lived. When the President died 
on May 5, 2009, he was succeeded by his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan. The President 
Jonathan administration has also been extensively involved in this illegal practice of 
granting waivers to businesses. In September 2011, as already mentioned, the Minister 
of Finance Ngozi Okonjo-Iwaeala announced that the powers to grant waivers had been 
transferred from the President to the Economic Team. Such a pronouncement meant that 
the Government was simply replacing one illegality with another illegality. This is so 
because there is no mention of the “Economic Team” in the laws governing the granting 
of custom duty waivers in Nigeria. On 30th November 2011, Daily Trust exclusively 
reported that the Federal Government granted rice and palm oil import duty waivers 
amounting to about N150 billion to 10 companies, with one of them securing the duty 
write offs 164 times since February 2011.68 Later in the year, the President directed that 
no import waiver should be granted in the 2012 fiscal year.69 This like all previous 
policy directives did not stand the test of time.  
 
On July 19, 2012, the Chairman House Committee on Finance Abdulmumin Jibrin 
asserted during a debate on the alleged non-implementation of the 2012 budget by the 
Federal Government at the plenary session of the House that “documents submitted to 
his committee by the Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Inland Revenue Service 
                                                 
67 Nigeria Daily News, ‘How Indian Firm Abuses Import Duty Waiver’ (August 31, 2008)  
http://ndn.nigeriadailynews.com/templates/?a=11944> (January 11, 2013).   
 
68 Daily Trust, ‘Nigeria: Rice, Palm Oil Imports- FG Grants N150 Billion Waivers to 10 Firms in 10 
Months’ (November 30, 2011) http://allafrica.com/stories/201111300315.html> (January 10, 2013)  
 
69 See Punch Newspaper downloaded on October 29, 2012 from 
http://beta.jangola.com/news/business/1498-fg-stops-import-duty-waiver.html  
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(FIRS) and the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) indicate that the government was still 
granting import waivers to some few individuals to import such items despite policy 
stopping it.” He further asserted that detailed analysis of the documents showed that “on 
the average, the government has granted minimum of N2 billion waivers per month 
from January to date to import rice, palm and vegetable oil”, and that “in the month of 
May 2012 alone, the government granted N39 billion waivers to some few 
individuals.”70 
Duty waiver is also abused when government grants waivers for developmental 
projects that have sectional appeal. Recently, for instance, President Goodluck 
Jonathan granted Ebonyi State import duty waiver worth N1.2 billion on the ductile 
iron pipe and accessories for the Oferekpe mega water scheme.71 While this no 
doubt will help improve the welfare of the people living in the state, the fact 
remains that such indiscriminate approvals distorts the principles of revenue 
allocation and sharing in a federal state. It is for instance legitimate for other states 
whose water projects have not benefited from such waivers to protest it on the 
above grounds. In this direction, it is important to remember that, as already stated, 
the Federal Government had in 1990 removed government contracts from the 
schedule of transactions granted duty waivers.  
It is no doubt because of the above abuses that the National Assembly has now 
commenced the process of repealing the Customs and Excise Management Act and 
replacing it with a Customs Service Act. One of the objectives of this exercise is to 
curtail the powers of the President to grant such duty waivers. According to the 
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Ahmed Makarfi, “the President must be 
stripped of arbitrary powers to grant import [duty] waivers.” He further stated that the 
“general view in the National Assembly is that such powers must not be exercised by 
any individual except if the legislature, by some legislation or resolution, takes a 
                                                 
70 See Daily Trust, ‘FG Still Grants Rice, Palm Oil Waivers- Reps’, (Undated), 
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 28 
decision about it.”72 Another objective of this exercise is to make Customs more 
independent of Government. Not surprisingly, the same government that has illegally 
abused the said Customs Act is now opposing the proposed changes. According to the 
Minister of Finance: 
 
The bill gives significant powers to the Customs Service and ordinarily this 
should not be a bad thing, but it does remove powers from the President and 
the minister that we think are necessary to ensure that the economic agenda of 
the country are properly carried out as directed by the President and delegated 
to the minister.73  
 
 In our view the highlighted proposed amendments to the Customs Act are unnecessary. 
Granting more powers to a Customs Service that is publicly acknowledged to be very 
corrupt will change nothing.74 The Minister of Finance is right that the economic agenda 
of the country must be driven by the President and his team. The focus of the National 
Assembly must be to call the President to order when he breaks the law. This is what the 
President(s) have consistently done when duty waivers are granted in secret and are not 
caused to be gazetted before coming into effect. The transparency of ensuring that this 
is done will no doubt greatly reduce any arbitrariness in the granting of such waivers. 
Granting concurrence powers to the National Assembly before waivers can be granted is 
also not advisable. In a corrupt oil rent dependent country like Nigeria, this will also be 
abused. It will simply provide members of the National Assembly with a bargaining 
chip to get their ‘fair’ allocation of the indiscriminate duty waivers. The problem 
therefore lies in enforcing existing laws rather than in making new ones. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the origins, law and practice of duty waivers in Nigeria. It 
argues that the brazen abuse of custom duty waivers in Nigeria is a consequence of the 
rentier nature of the Nigerian state which has progressively eroded the inherent internal 
controls for prudent fiscal relationships among the various tiers of government in a 
federal state. This paper has also shown that since the Obasanjo civilian administration 
in Nigeria, custom duty waivers have been consistently abused by all Nigerian 
Presidents. Such abuses have culminated in the current attempt by the National 
Assembly to amend the Customs Act in order to strip the President of his powers to 
grant duty waivers. This however cannot be the solution. The problem is not with the 
existing law but with its implementation. This is so because the granting of 
indiscriminate customs duty waivers documented above were all done outside the 
boundaries of the law. The basic requirement that such waivers be gazetted before they 
become effective is rarely adhered to. An effective strategy towards addressing this 
problem would be for the National Assembly to hold the President accountable when 
duty waiver laws are flouted. Admittedly, this will not be easy in an oil rent economy 
like Nigeria. As President Jonathan has once asserted, “it would be difficult to form a 
viable citizenry that could call government to account for its stewardship if the economy 
depends solely on oil revenue.’75 In the context of a rentier state, the proposed plan by 
the National Assembly to grant itself concurrence powers before waivers can be granted 
by the President should be discouraged because it will be abused. It will simply provide 
members of the National Assembly with a bargaining chip to get their ‘fair’ allocation 
of the indiscriminate duty waivers. This will aggravate the problem rather than solve it.  
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